On 2026-10-08 the Zilliqa X-Bridge's only validator — an operational key of Zilliqa's own bridge infrastructure — signed four withdrawal messages to itself and executed them 32 seconds later, draining ≈$1.0M. The Zilliqa side emitted zero matching exits; the USDT message alone claimed 103.39% of the entire zUSDT supply. Every exit-scam marker, each checkable by hash.
A forensic reconstruction of the 42DAO Balance Coin exploit on BNB Chain: how a centralized push oracle and Dai-style ward-gated minting combined to inflate BLC 28× and drain $915K. Verified entirely from on-chain bytecode and verified source via cast/forge/heimdall.
A nonce-truncation bug in the Zilliqa Ledger app (schnorr.c, since 2019) leaks 64 bits per signature. A lattice HNP attack recovers the private key from 4–5 public signatures.
A forensic reconstruction of the $63M+ Balancer V2 exploit: how a scaling-factor rounding inconsistency in ComposableStablePool invariant math was weaponized in a 226-swap batchSwap. Verified entirely from on-chain data via cast/forge.